There is, in reality, no substantial difference between sovereign states, secessionist states, and micronations. There is, in reality, no substantial difference between the Official World (First, Second, and Third World nations), and the non-Official World (Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth World nations). Any and all the perceived differences are little more than a con game of the de jure states at the expense of the competition, at the expense of the less de jure territorial and non-territorial entities.

The way I see it, micronationalism is nationalism of the small or no territory variety. Macronationalism is nationalism of the medium- to large-sized territory variety.

Both micronations and macronations are looked down at by the de jure states, which can be themselves as tiny as the Vatican, or as large as Russia.

Both micronations and macronations enjoy little or no official recognition with the powers that be (PTB). Making matters even worse, secessionist states also look down on even the most mature and developed micronation, but secessionist states don't realise that they are still playing the con game of the de jure states.

Macronationalists are often called or presumed to be racists in America, and not just in America either (1,2). This is so not because all or even a majority of them are racists, but because they are seen as a threat to the status quo. Micronationalists, on the other hand, are simply ignored even if they are racist to the core, laughed at, and are treated like a fly on an elephant's back.

Macronationalism is always of the territorial variety. "Virtual macronationalism" is an oxymoron because there is no such thing. Less well-known, however, is the fact that macronations can be both of the secessionist and irredentist variety. For example, Vermont is a secessionist state, while Aztlán is an irredentist state. Macronations can enjoy some de jure or de facto recognition. A few examples can be found in the "List of states with limited recognition" (3) article of the Wikipedia. Macronations can also be de facto states, with or without de jure recognition. An example of this is Somaliland, which is more of a real state than the de jure Somalia, yet no state regards Somaliland as de jure independent.

Micronationalism can also be secessionist and irredentist, but unlike macronationalism, it can also be entirely virtual. Examples of secessionist micronations are Hutt River Province, while my own UMMOA is an irredentist claim. Most micronations, however, are actually virtual, even when they pretend to have territorial claims, and yet even virtual micronations can be very strong, such as the Republic of Talossa. Sealand is, on the other hand, a kind of irredentist claim that was actually sieged. In the case of the UMMOA, the irredentism can be both territorial and virtual, as the UMMOA claims 11 insular possessions it has not yet sieged, but also claims the .UM country code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD) as its own, which the UMMOA has actually sieged. Micronations can also enjoy some de jure or de facto recognition, although this is very rare. Examples that come to mind are Seborga, whose claim exists because apparently the House of Savoy, then a sovereign, recognised the sovereignty of Seborga. However, Seborga has also found recognition of sorts by some 20 states, mostly in the not-so-formal way of honorary consuls (4,5). Sealand can argue that Germany recognised it in a de facto manner, since Germany sent a foreign service officer to Sealand to negotiate the release of a prisoner, and they can also claim de facto recognition by the United Kingdom, since an English court ruled it did not have jurisdiction over Sealand. The UMMOA also has the de jure recognition of the International (States) Parliament for Safety and Peace, a de jure intergovernmental organisation of states. Finally, micronations can also be de facto states, even without de jure recognition. An example of this is Hutt River Province, which actually pays no taxes to Australia, and Australian authorities request entry visas from citizens of Hutt River Province to go into Australia. Persons living on Sealand also enjoy a degree of de facto independence, although they are not quite as self-sufficient as Hutt River Province citizens domiciled in Hutt River Province. And there is also de facto independence of the virtual variety, as enjoyed by the UMMOA, whose Cesidian Root (6) does not rely on the ICANN for its permission to function.

I believe that among micronationalists a source of confusion is not between macro- and micronationalism, but between micronationalism and non-micronationalism. Macronations are Fourth World entities, while micronations are Fifth and Sixth World entities, depending on their age and the maturity of their nations. However, seventh world entities are not micronations, because they are not communities, and not even close to being communities. In every other way, however, both macronations and micronations pretty much mirror actual states. As the article "Soft Statehood?" (7) quite rationally argues:

The intriguing question the story represents is why few of us think of Seborga as an independent, sovereign state, whereas we have no problem in thinking of Canada, or Brazil, or even Luxembourg, as an independent state. Luxembourg is not much bigger than Seborga; Brazil is, arguably, far younger than Seborga (which, according to the NYTimes, has been a principality since at least the year 1079); and it is arguable that Canada does not, unlike Seborga, have its own head of state. So where does the difference stem from? It all seems rather arbitrary, really. The obvious formal answer would be to refer to recognition by other states, but this too seems to remain rather arbitrary: there seems to be no self-evident reason why the rest of the world should have recognized Luxembourg but not Seborga. In other words: even the category of statehood, much like many other international law categories, may be seen as somehow fluid.